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Introducing the Taxonomic Problem(s)
 The contested site of ‘religion’:
 Defining/Classifying ‘Religion’: Raises the problem of essentialism.
 Typically formulated in binary oppositions: Authentic/Fake,
(Super)Natural/Invented, True/False, etc.—Religion

 The contested site of axiological normativity:
 Assessing the “proper” (i.e., objectively True) in relation to questions
of value and taste
 Typically formulated in binary oppositions: Good/Bad, Right/Wrong,
Healthy/Unhealthy, etc.—Value/Taste

In both cases: The privileging of the first pole over the second
raises epistemological questions concerning “proper” foundations
and authority in matters pertaining to classification (e.g., legal,
academic, cultural) with religio-political implications; the conflation
of these two contested sites in popular (political) culture sets the
stage for a rhetoric of “warfare” with the possibility of a “privileging
of the self through the pathologizing of the Other” (Contingencies of
Value: Alternative Perspectives for Critical Theory, Barbara Herrnstein Smith)

I. The Politics of Religion
 1. Politics of Religion: Lawrence O’Donnell introduces Mitt Romney’s
(political) religion problem; Romney knows it and has invented a
religion problem for Obama.
 2. Grafting Romney: Mitt Romney states: “there is in this country a war
on religion”; “there is a desire to establish a religion in America known
as secularism”; “I know that based upon reports, the Obama
administration gave this a lot of thought , a lot of discussion.”
 3. Inventing a Problem/Religion: Lawrence O’Donnell states: Romney
has “as bad a religion problem as anyone who has ever run for
president and is trying to create a religion problem for President Obama
. . . a political religion problem”
 4. Strategizing: O’Donnell compares this strategy to the swift-boating
of Kerry; similarly, Romney projects his religion problem on to the
(religio)-political other; “a much-used page of the Republican playbook”
 5. Cue the Poll: Gallup: “showing voter reluctance based on a
candidate’s religion.” Atheist: 49%, Muslim: 46%, Mormon: 22%, Jewish
9%, Baptist: 7%, Catholic: 7%

I. The Politics of Religion
 6. Non-Existent Religion: O’Donnell concludes that Romney “doesn’t
just attack President Obama’s religion, he invents a whole new
religion; a religion that doesn’t even exist, and attributes it to President
Obama.”
 7. New Religion: Why “invent” this new religion and attribute it to
Obama? Part of Romney’s religion problem is that he is a member of
a “new religion” “Established religions . . . don’t easily warm up to
new religions”
 8. Sex Sells: On the sexual “origin” of Mormonism
 9. Rationale: Romney must accuse the President of creating a newer
religion than his own, since he can’t “get away now with accusing
Barack Obama of being a secret Muslim”; “So, instead of calling
Barack Obama a Muslim, he is calling him an atheist.”
 10. Conclusion: “In the Politics of Religion in this country, the only
thing that’s worse than being a Mormon or a Muslim in the eyes of our
extremely religiously intolerant electorate is being an Atheist.”
1-10 above are transcriptions of The Last Word with Lawrence O’Donnell in a segment
called The Rewrite, on MSNBC (aired on April 3, 2012)

II. In(ter)vention, Irony & Romney

 Political intervention by means of a rhetoric of war(fare) on
religion
 Desire to establish a religion of secularism
 The irony of attributing a desire to both declare a war on
religion and establish a religion
 Evokes the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause
 “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion . . . ” (U.S. Constitution,
Amendment I)
 The ironic (or self-referential) problem of flirting with a
transgression of the spirit of Article VI, clause 3 of the U.S.
Constitution
 “no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification
to any Office or public trust under the United States”
 How? By calling into question Obama’s supposed
motivations with respect to the Establishment Clause
 Effects a privileging of the (religio-political) self at the
expense of the devalued, suspicious, pathologized (religiopolitical) other

II. In(ter)vention, Irony & O’Donnell
 Political intervention by means of a critique of Romney’s
rhetoric of war(fare) on religion
 Desire to critique Romney’s invention of a “whole new”
religion of secularism “that doesn’t even exist”
 The irony of attributing a strategy of othering to Romney as a
deflection of his own political religion problem, while
engaging in a wholesale othering not only of Romney and
Mormonism but also “the extremely religiously intolerant
electorate,” which O’Donnell cannot tolerate
 Apology: The offense generated by his remarks and the
overwhelmingly negative social media attacks, required
O’Donnell to apologize for his statements about Mormonism .
 The (ironic) point: his “preaching” about religious toleration;
we should not vote based on (ir)religious affiliation—the
politics of religion elides into a religion of politics.

III. Classification, Invention & Propriety
 My contingent reading of O’Donnell’s reading of Romney’s
reading of Obama on religion:
 Neither Romney’s “invention” nor his strategy is all that
inventive
 The religion of secular humanism and/or secularism has been a
contested legal site at the level of the Supreme Court since at
least the sixties when similar arguments were made regarding
the Establishment Clause and the “existence” of secularism as a
religion in our public schools.
 The Humanist Manifesto (1933) claimed the title of religion.
 Consequently, the binary oppositions authentic/fake or
natural/invented (religion) are called into question.
 This either/or formulation appears to ignore the culturally
constructed context of classification and how specific discursive
communities “divide up” (or “invent”) the world differently without
an absolute standard against which to determine its veracity.

III. Classification, Invention & Propriety
 Academic:
 Theorists, historians, and philosophers of religion cannot agree on
the (essentialist) borders of ‘religion’ or the “proper” authority to
adjudicate (and, thus, police) such limits:
 “‘Religion’ is not a native term; it is a term created by scholars
for their intellectual purposes and therefore is theirs to define.”
(“Religion, Religions, Religious,” Jonathan Z. Smith)

 “[T]he very term religion, including its definition, application,
and extension, does not, in fact, belong solely to academics but
is constantly at stake in the interchanges of cultural discourses
and practices.” (Authentic Fakes: Religion and American Popular Culture,
David Chidester)

 Legal:
 Based on the absence of uncontested decisions among Supreme
Court justices with respect to rulings about the boundaries of
religion, we find a similar undecidability; although, this does not
appear to preclude judges from deciding with whom the proper
authority resides to make determinations regarding what religion
“is.”

III. Religion and Popular Culture
 Taking the Playful Nature of Popular Culture Seriously
 Religion and popular culture as academic fields have been
subjected to a rhetorical devaluing not unlike the political
strategy on display in the video.
 As in other asymmetrical binary oppositions, popular
culture has been traditionally relegated to the status of the
devalued other of high culture.
 The outcry on various social media sites (as well as the
satirical commentary on The Daily Show with Jon Stewart)
due to this video segment underscores the ‘serious’
influence of popular culture on matters of religion and
politics (traditionally ‘sacred’—as in set apart—spheres).
 Thus, as a site of identity construction and political influence,
popular culture appears to be no less ‘serious’ for its
‘playfulness.’

The Problem Of/With Religion
 In/conclusion:
 Whether the target of religio-political pathologizing is an
individual, a group, a culture, or a field of study, this appears
to be symptomatic of a foundational problem—a problem of
(a desire for) foundations that obscures its self-authorization
as a process of contingent textual production and an effect of
language.
 Textual productions that do not signal their contingent,
instituted “origins” may be susceptible to an unquestioning
reification (i.e., objectification) of its categories.
 Consequently, the problem of ‘religion’ may be viewed and
addressed as a structural problem with ‘religion’ in American
culture, politics, and law requiring an analysis of the
complexities involved when defining and classifying
‘religion.’

